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Part I:  Castrations 
Julia Kristeva’s The Severed Head: Capital Visions is a formidable text to 
grasp theoretically.  One can be easily fascinated by its enchanting language 
and subject matter:  for example, a melting snowman, skull worship and 
decoration, Saint John the Baptist’s heavenly face surrounded by an 
abundance of dark brown curls, puckered lips that invite a kiss, suggesting as 
Kristeva writes, “the most amorous of dreams,"1 all served up on a glassy 
platter.  But what exactly is the primary theoretical proposition, and do all the 
secondary propositions accord with it?   
Chapter One, “On Drawing: or, the Speed of Thought,” features an 
ostensibly charming anecdote about a radio show contest, during a wintry 
season in Bulgaria, that poses the question of “What is the quickest means of 
transportation in the world?”  It is Kristeva’s mother who cleverly comes up 
with the winning response—“thought”—that she in turn submits on a 
postcard on which she draws a liquefying snowman, “his head falling off, as 
though severed by the invisible guillotine of the sun,"2 to illustrate her 
thought.  That the mother is the one to represent a decapitation, which in the 
book stands for the child’s separation from the mother, is noteworthy, to say 
the least.  One might have assumed that the last thing a mother should model 
for her daughter is the need to commit matricide, since after such a 
demonstration, obviously, the daughter’s very act of detachment would be 
sabotaged, by being instigated by a maternal act undermining the psychically 
necessary daughterly autonomy.  But Kristeva makes no mention of this 
strange kink in her story and instead simply seems to take the mother’s 
snowman drawing as being “in the direct line of Byzantine icons,"3 in which 
a thoughtful inscription-to-be-contemplated rather than a mimetic visual 
representation is the salient idea.  She weaves the drawing into her theory 
F r a n c e s  L .  R e s t u c c i a  |  5 7  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVI, No 2 (2018)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2018.858 
without any apparent concern about the mother initiating her own (that is, 
the mother’s) decapitation.  One might even wonder if Kristeva’s struggle to 
extricate herself from melancholia depends on such an encroachment by the 
mother on young Kristeva’s effort to negate the object of loss.  Kristeva’s Black 
Sun:  Depression and Melancholia begins by asserting that no writing on 
melancholia could be of value without emerging from such “an abyss of 
sorrow”: “For those who are racked by melancholia, writing about it would 
have meaning only if writing sprang out of that very melancholia."4  Kristeva, 
that is, can inform us about depression because she has been there. 
 The central theory of the severed head (however) is that it is a way of 
making the invisible visible so that we may “stand up to the void."5  It is then 
possible to compensate for the separation (or our loss), Kristeva writes, “by 
taking control.  By concentrating on one’s own ability to represent, by 
investing in the representations one can make, one’s own representations of 
that other, the abandoner, . . . .  [G]rieving is dependent on sublimation."6  One 
cannot but notice here Kristeva’s emphasis on “one’s own representations” as 
it is contradicted by her mother’s snowman drawing and its entry into a 
contest that the mother wins for her daughter.   
 Chapter Two, “The Skull,” poses another theoretical challenge.  
Kristeva lays out in great detail a history of various forms of skull worship, 
starting with the hominids of the Lower Paleolithic, two-million to one-
hundred-thousand years before Christ, up to the present.  She discusses the 
cannibalistic consumption of the brain as well as artistic embellishments that 
transform the skull into a work of art.  Oddly enough, she points out, Freud 
(who clearly engaged in oral pleasure) overlooked that the cannibalistic ritual 
was “as much if not more an appropriation of the mother’s power than a 
devouring of the father tyrant.”  To Kristeva, skull worship, and in particular 
cannibalistic and totemic meals, are ways of naming the loss of the nurturing 
body, envisioning it, appropriating it, consuming it so as (she also writes) not 
to “lose it,” ways of rediscovering “the pleasure of the archaic orality that this 
breast, this mass, this head provided."7  But isn’t such appropriation a way of 
losing the maternal body rather than clinging to it?  Is to consume or worship 
the maternal body to possess it or to detach from it?  The critical question here 
would seem to be “how much” of the mother is retained in the “rediscovery”?   
When Kristeva explicitly theorizes her findings, she in fact presents a 
doubleness. Skull worship had two psychoanalytic functions: it 
commemorated “the original loss of the mother, [the mother being] the source 
of melancholy, and the phallic trial, the threat of castration by the father.”  We 
have here, she continues, “a double celebration:  that of the rival phallic father 
and that of the mother who abandoned us."8  But if “the original loss of the 
mother” is being commemorated, how could that be in order not to lose it, as 
she earlier writes?  Is to rediscover, or even to commemorate the loss, also not 
to lose?  And perhaps I would not even pose that question were Kristevan 
theory less ambivalent about castration, as we shall see below. 
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Not to lose the mother, then, might seem to head in the wrong direction.  
And yet, if somehow to commemorate “the original loss of the mother” is a 
way not to lose her (as inconsistent as that may sound, since not to lose the 
mother is what generates melancholia), perhaps that is why skull worship is 
simultaneously necessary to militate against castration, in order to enable a 
certain amount, so to speak, of hanging on to the maternal body.  Do we not 
have here a form of psychoanalytic sublation where to abolish is 
simultaneously to preserve, so that castration must be fended off, or somehow 
only partially accepted, for the sake of that preservation?  In this case the 
abandoning mother would be celebrated at the risk of melancholia, and the 
rival phallic father would be pushed back.  The key conundrum is (to 
reiterate) why, if separation from the mother is the primary goal, would 
resistance to castration (castration being tantamount to acceptance of that 
loss) be desirable?  To worship the skull (for example) is to confront death in 
a way that carves out a psychic space facilitating creativity; then to turn the 
skull into, say, a goblet in which to have a drink of wine, is to gain control 
over one’s fear of death, thus setting in motion a kind of protection.  Yet the 
defense here (a goblet) embodies the very thing that simultaneously is being 
defended against (death/the mother), for the goblet itself carries a taste of the 
mother.  To stay tied to her, one must resist “total castration.”  According to 
this understanding of why castration is a threat, Kristevan theory holds back 
from a full relinquishment of melancholia.   
 But, bracketing these double moves and apparent inconsistencies, let us 
for the moment simply state that the main idea of the worshipped and 
decorated skull as it provides a synecdoche for all representations of severed 
heads, to Kristeva, is “to pass through the ‘arc of Nothingness’ . . . so as to 
then move beyond it,"9 to separate.  Psychoanalysis insists on an interiorizing 
of mortality as indispensable to the execution of a pictorial act, whether it be 
through an artistic fashioning of skulls or prominent Western paintings.  The 
“sliced-off head” must be confronted, its terror meditated on, and 
appropriated through a reflection or, better, an image.  And yet, again, to 
return to a central theoretical complication, in invoking the severed heads cut 
from limestone by the Celts, Kristeva comments on the “seriousness and 
anguish of a melancholy of . . .  implacable elegance” that is perhaps rivaled 
only by Nerval’s “black sun."10  Is a represented severed head emblematic of 
separation or of melancholic attachment to death/the mother?  Or both? 
“Who is Medusa?” Chapter Three, adds another theoretical puzzle.  
Kristeva understands the Medusa legend primarily as “a dialectic of 
representation” that is “formed between Perseus and the Gorgon that 
basically reproduces the ambivalent passions of the mother-child 
separation."11  Here representation, the reflection of Medusa on Perseus’s 
shield, enables the necessary killing, standing for the requisite “matricide.”12  
The horror must be faced, not “face-to-face” but with the assistance of a 
“simulacrum” or an image.13  Continuing to illustrate this notion, Kristeva 
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reads Cellini’s magnificent bronze statue of Perseus in the Loggia dei Lanzi in 
Florence as displaying the hero’s “castration” through his “triumph over the 
mother”14 insofar as he appropriates her face and head through 
representation.  Thus the Medusa myth “prefigures an aesthetic of 
incarnation."15    
However, in the middle of her analysis, Kristeva grants to Medusa a 
different, more narrow or particular meaning.  Not only does Medusa stand 
for the mother, in the passionate tug-of-war between child and mother, but 
also she emblematizes the potentially consuming female genitals.  Now the 
slimy abject creature turns into a “sexually aroused female” whose vulva-on-
display possesses even “more than phallic power” that terrorizes, by wielding 
the weapon of the threat of castration.  Thus to represent Medusa is to protect 
oneself from castration, whereas earlier to represent Medusa was to accept 
castration or in Kristeva’s terminology to negate the loss.  (To Kristeva, 
depressives “disavow the negation:  they cancel it out, suspend it, and 
nostalgically fall back on the real object [the Thing] of their loss”; negation is 
“the intellectual process that leads the repressed to representation” and that 
“inserts an aspect of desire and unconscious idea into consciousness”16)  That 
is:  why, if castration or the struggle to lose the mother, is ultimately desirable, 
is the mother-figure a castrating threat?  Can she set in motion (perhaps like 
Kristeva’s mother) the very castration that enables her “victim” to achieve 
liberation from her?  And does she terrify men more than women, perhaps 
since their ambivalence over losing her is more intense:  men fear losing the 
object of their desire, even as they know they must lose it to take on their 
masculinity, to be men, and so are horrified by the possibility of collapsing 
back into that black hole?   
Nevertheless, whereas an alignment between the mother and death 
(Kristeva rhetorically asks, “Isn’t the life provided by the mother the life of 
death?”) may be acceptable, allowing us to agree in turn with Kristeva’s 
assumption that Medusa is “essentially the iconic human experience,"17 an 
icon for all, once Medusa is taken to stand in particular for female genitals, 
the “human experience” shrinks to that of fearful men needing protection 
from castration by the all-engulfing female body.  Are Medusan images of 
decapitation inscriptions of the abyss that gives birth, imprintings of the void 
as a condition for thought and creativity, iconic strokes that feature the cut, in 
general, or a playing out of male fantasy, more specifically?  (Kristeva accepts 
Freud’s idea that men reap erotic excitement from their anxiety over 
castration.)   
 In “Beheadings,” Chapter Seven, resistance to castration comes to the 
fore.  Kristeva surprises us with her proposition that the mature speaking 
subject has at its disposal “the resources of . . . eroticism and language” to 
combat “the terrifying risk of castration,"18 as though fear rather than 
acceptance of castration is foremost.  Moreover, one would think that 
eroticism and especially language would help to effect castration (rather than 
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protect against it), facilitating separation.  The meaning of castration seems to 
shift.  It is a positive psychic move but also at times in the book poses a threat.  
Kristeva can seem to vacillate between an emphasis on a castrating 
acceptance/negation of loss/lack to effect desiring subjectivity and a 
castrating loss of power—emasculation—so that castration swings from being 
psychically beneficial to terrifying.     
Whether Kristeva has in mind men or women does seem to be a factor 
that alters the meaning of castration.  She claims that “graphic and pictorial 
figuration . . . wonderfully explains, through the profuse, virtuosic treatments 
of the beheading theme,” two dominant anxieties that underpin “the course 
to the visible"19; here sexual difference splits the experience with the mother.  
For, in general, it is the man who feels anxiety due to a fear of the all-powerful 
mother’s ability to castrate him or strip him of power, while the woman fears 
the loss of the mother, and for that reason holds back from an advantageous 
castration/separation.  The visible, Kristeva claims, is “a sublime defense 
against these two fears."20   
Kristeva’s discussion of Artemisa Gentileschi’s paintings implies, 
however, that women also have something else to fear—that they act and 
paint in response to men’s aggression.  Women appear to have an “extra” 
problem beyond detaching from the maternal body—that is, protecting 
themselves from violations inflicted by men.  Kristeva focuses on three 
decapitating women:  Salome, whose dancing results in a “liberating 
violence,”21 which as we know produces the gorgeous curly brown head; 
Judith, whose severing of Holofernes’ head turns her into a “positive version 
of the Gorgon,"22and whose triumph Gentileschi celebrates in the “most 
spectacular of her achievements”23; and the Philistine Delilah who, having 
discovered the source of the power of Samson, a Jewish judge, has his 
precious locks cut off.  Where exactly do we situate the woman’s vengeance 
that leads her to become a decapitator in the broad picture of Kristeva’s 
theory?  And how much does it matter that the painter of such vengeful 
women is a woman herself seeking revenge (Gentileschi was raped in her 
studio) or a man both gaining control over and excitement from the castrating 
woman?  Also, how much consideration should we give to whether the 
woman is perceived as being politically on the “right” side and thus taken to 
commit a beneficial act (as in the case of Judith) or the “wrong” side (as in the 
case of Delilah)?    
 Toward the end of The Severed Head, Kristeva focuses on the veil—
whose relation to the severed head we are prompted to ponder.  Whether 
there is a correspondence between the veil and the severed head is an 
intriguing question.  Kristeva asks if a veiled woman is “a venerated, 
protected woman, as the chador may seem to indicate and claim?  Or a 
sacrificed, decapitated, immured woman?”24  Her response comes across 
indirectly.  For next she comments that “Seurat’s Veil is completely 
different."25  Kristeva delights in the idea that here we have a traversal of grief, 
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even a “passage”—“passage” being perhaps the most privileged concept in 
The Severed Head—that exceeds the limits of the visible.  Kristeva highly 
praises Seurat’s Veil painting for resorbing the visible in the beyond at the 
same time as it dissolves the beyond in the visible, a perfect two-way passage.  
And yet, at the last minute, she hesitates—in order to wonder if Seurat’s 
unknown heroine is, after all, “a subtle version of that elusive female who 
simply melts away in a man’s gaze, like a piece of sugar."26  Does feminism 
again creep into, overshadow, and maybe even throw off Kristeva’s 
psychoanalytically based reading?  Or do we have here (with the image of 
melting sugar) a reincarnation of Kristeva’s mother’s melting snowman? Or—
a third possibility—does this image of Seurat’s veiled/decapitated, sugary 
woman not brilliantly embody the theoretical problem at hand, blending a 
psychoanalytically advantageous representation with a woman suffering 
from and struggling with “the male gaze”? 
 Although I cannot claim that all the loose ends discussed here will be 
tied up in the following brief conclusion, it seems a valid and perhaps 
necessary move now to zero in on a paradox central to Kristeva’s thought.  
Psychoanalytic sublation—where to destroy is also to preserve or to lose is 
also to find—would seem to be the uniqueness and beauty of Kristeva’s 
theory of the severed head.  We can also deduce from Kristeva’s various 
accounts of represented severed heads that women and men have distinct 
psychic predispositions toward, and needs in relation to, such representation, 
as women, given their identification with the maternal object, tend to pull 
away with reluctance, whereas men panic over their simultaneous desire for 
the mother and need to give her up.  The Severed Head gestures toward all this 
and then manages subtly to add a feminist dimension, folding (as always in 
Kristeva) the psychic together with the social.     
Part II:  What the Pomegranate Tree Knows 
Kristeva absolutely distinguishes between real decapitations and 
represented ones.  She believes, in fact, that “[s]laughter turned to image 
assuages the violence”27—so long as the image inspires contemplation, 
which, for example, insubstantial televised clips of violence cannot.  In 
dismissing televised clips as beneficial representations of decapitation, 
Kristeva invokes the fundamentalist practice of slaughter and slicing throats 
in “Biafra, Vietnam, Rwanda, and Algeria."28  The combination of this allusion 
and her implication about the Muslim veil no doubt provokes the question of 
Islamophobia in some readers’ minds.  But this would be to ignore, for one 
thing, that Kristeva devotes an entire chapter of The Severed Head, “From the 
Guillotine to the Abolition of Capital Punishment,” to acknowledging the 
atrocities of the guillotine in France.  She points out as well that, “the 1981 
abolition of the death penalty, which in France is bound up with the 
guillotine, should not let us forget that this decision does not have the support 
of a national majority even today."29   
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Moreover, it is possible to find writing in the Islamic world that pushes 
back—specifically through Kristevan literary gestures—against real 
eruptions of the death drive.  In other words, her theory operates in, and we 
might say cooperates with, the very Islamic world whose violence she makes 
one of her foci.  Kristevan theory, in other words, does not distinguish 
between the Western and non-Western or, more specifically, Christian and 
Islamic worlds.  Non-western writers take it up; it is not merely a Western 
theoretical phenomenon.  In Intimate Revolt, Kristeva proposes that narrative 
and “the place it reserves for meditation” have the potential to offer a 
“minimal variant of revolt.”  In part due to its ability to reach a wide number 
of readers, the genre of the novel is “privileged terrain” for psychic 
explorations that entail a “rehabilitation of the sensory” and a “questioning 
and displacement of the past”—two key elements of Kristeva’s concept of 
“intimate revolt."30  The Corpse Washer by Sinan Antoon, an Iraqi author, not 
only fits this description of the novel, as it (in contrast to Western TV news) 
poetically highlights sensuous aspects of Iraqi life as well as questions its 
oppressive atmosphere, but it also enacts the theory of The Severed Head by 
making death a character, if not the main protagonist, of the book and 
featuring severed heads.  The Corpse Washer responds to actual decapitations 
by giving them substantial aesthetic representation.     
The novel’s narrator hears death telling him that it is a “postman” who 
delivers “letters,” the corpses, that the narrator opens and washes, dries, and 
perfumes, wrapping them finally for “their final reader—the grave."31  (The 
word “reader” certainly implies that they are delivered for us as well.)  Death 
pervades the maghasil (the corpse-washing facility) to the point that it seems 
to be “the real owner”32 for whom Jawad’s father works, rather than God, as 
the father seems to think.  Jawad imagines death following him home and 
paying for the food on the table at their evening meals.  And because of the 
mayhem the Americans cause in Baghdad, death becomes a soccer player:  
corpses pile up “like goals scored by death on behalf of rabid teams in a never-
ending game."33  This novel unsparingly offers the reader a chance to confront 
the void, as dead bodies seem to litter almost every page.  
Focused on a young man in Iraq whose father pressures him to walk in 
his footsteps by becoming a corpse washer but who yearns to be an artist, The 
Corpse Washer seems especially “Kristevan” in presenting the very issue of 
drawing the dead.  A sublimatory act privileged in Kristeva as a way of 
channeling the death drive, such drawing in this Islamic context, however, is 
regarded as sacrilegious.   After taking an art class, Jawad first draws his 
father’s face, a representation of what we might consider an appropriate 
decapitation, since he reproduces only the face.  Coming even closer to the 
kind of depictions Kristeva encourages, Jawad draws again the face alone but 
now of a dead man in his father’s mghaysil.  Finding out about this drawing, 
his father has an angry fit, charging Jawad with shamefully destroying the 
peace and sanctity of the dead.  In a violent act of its own that attacks the very 
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thing Kristeva promotes as a way of freeing the death drive, the father tears 
the drawing to pieces.  However, Jawad’s art teacher, in contrast, makes 
Kristeva’s case, insisting that art is “intimately linked with immortality:  a 
challenge to death and time, a celebration of life,” noting as well that their 
“ancestors in Mesopotamia were the first to pose all these questions in their 
myths and in the epic of Gilgamesh, and that Iraq was the first and biggest art 
workshop in the world.  In addition to inventing writing and building the first 
cities and temples, the first works of art and statues had appeared in ancient 
Iraq during the Sumerian era and now fill museums all over the world.  Many 
still remain underground.”  And such an inheritance, he adds optimistically, 
is what enables modern Iraqi art to be “so fertile."34   
The Corpse Washer itself extends this legacy and expands this fertile 
ground, as it self-reflexively argues for art in the Muslim world of Iraq and 
does so in a Kristevan vein, by offering two levels of critique.  The novel 
presents an arduous melancholic struggle, replete with castration anxiety 
over detaching from the father, the mother, and death, through art, as a way 
of showing the especially thick melancholic quagmire of Iraq.  The text in 
addition offers itself, like Perseus’s shield, as a thorough reflection of death, 
riveted on the washing of corpses, many of which are described in horrific 
detail.  Early in the book, a man burned to death at a petrochemical plant is 
brought in to be washed:  “The fire had eaten away his skin . . . discolored all 
over.”  Jawad vomits that day and is “sick for days."35  The reader as well 
wants to expel the horror.36  
In his Preface Antoon situates the genre of the novel in “a liminal space 
between the real and the imaginary"37—a Kristevan (“sacred”) intersection.  
The Corpse Washer commences with a beautiful dream of the narrator’s long 
lost lover, Reem, but also of masked men who decapitate Jawad, the dreamer, 
with the “cold blade” of a knife that penetrates his neck, resulting in his head 
falling to the ground and rolling “like a ball on the sand."38  Even more 
ghoulish or Kristevan, the narrator, or actually just his head, then observes his 
body as it kneels in a pool of blood.  Variations on this nightmare portray 
Reem’s talking “severed head” that requests, “Wash me, darling."39  And no 
doubt the culmination of the entire book is the unforgettable chapter forty-
five—in which a man brings in his dead son, Habib, in the form of “‘only the 
head."40  Although he is “disgusted,” Jawad washes delicately and with great 
care this severed head, and Antoon does not spare us a detailed description:  
“The edges of the severed neck were yellowish like the rest of the face.  I could 
see the tattered skin tissue and flesh and the dried pink and gray ends of blood 
vessels.  There was a huge scar on his right cheek and a black spot on his 
forehead."41  Jawad scrubs Habib’s hair “carefully from the forehead all the 
way to the neck,” as his assistant pours the water, causing a “few clots of dried 
blood [to fall] off the neck."42  Jawad washes a second time with camphor and 
then just water, dries the head and stuffs cotton into the nostrils and around 
the neck.  He anoints the forehead, nose, and cheeks with camphor, and he 
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and his assistant wrap the head in a shroud.  Jawad carries the head to its 
coffin and covers it as he recites to the father, “‘God have mercy on his soul."43  
Later, after long silence, Jawad notes in his book of the dead that he has 
washed:  Habib, “‘severed head.'"44 
Beaten back by what we might call his “castration anxiety,” fear of loss of 
his origins, Jawad, however, struggles with the Kristevan meaning of the 
severed head.  Throughout the book he oscillates between death and art.  The 
novel’s unmistakable non-chronological structure as well as its repetition of 
the Qur’anic verse “Every soul shall taste death” (which surfaces both in 
reality and in Jawad’s dreams) reflects his capture by melancholic 
atemporality.  For the melancholic, time is “erased or bloated, absorbed into 
sorrow,”45 as Kristeva explains in Black Sun.  Jawad is unable to accept 
multiple losses:  his father (who dies), his brother (who dies in the war against 
Iran), Reem (who leaves him), and his friend Basim (who gets killed by the 
Americans; one of the men Jawad washes brings back into his mind an image 
of Basim to the point that Jawad says to himself, “I’ve already seen him dead in 
my own arms once before.")46  As a result we find Jawad at the end of the novel 
clinging to his mother, for fear of another tremendous loss.  His depression 
keeps him from being able to lose; he has, perhaps, failed to find “valid 
compensation for” his losses, since “any loss entails the loss of [his] being—
and of Being itself,”47 again to quote from Black Sun.   
Although Jawad admires Giacometti who wanted to sculpt “not man but 
the shadow he left behind,"48 as though death itself could be sculpted, and 
paints his own “variation on Giacometti” in depicting “a naked, wire-thin 
woman walking toward a white horizon,"49 Jawad eventually accepts his 
father’s sense of art, or at least acts on it in not acting at all, even at the level 
of his unconscious (we detect this failure in his guilt-ridden dreams).  Jawad’s 
father repeats the word “painter” “as if it were a disgrace."50  Although Jawad 
imagines his father worrying that Jawad will “sever” his “last bonds to him” 
and succeed “in leaving his sphere,” and he even confronts his father’s dead 
body as a kind of severed head (in wrapping him in a shroud, Hammoudy 
leaves “only his face exposed”51) and boldly states to his father that he will 
give up working as a corpse washer, a “mysterious force”52 sucks him back.  
“Did you have something to do with it, Father?  Are you happy now?”53 
Jawad asks himself as he addresses his father.  He turns out to be no more free 
than the “stupid fly” who, earlier in the book when Jawad works as a house 
painter, buzzes into the “sticky surface of paint and struggle[s] there for a few 
seconds before dying."54   
In the end Thanatos governs Jawad just as for him Eros is blocked:  he 
cannot explain even to himself why he let his second love interest, Ghayda’, 
go.  Although his mother urges him to marry Ghayda’, Jawad is now bogged 
down, as one of his dreams makes clear, over “leaving [his] mother alone."55  
Rather than become a sculptor, Jawad in one of his dreams takes a Giacometti 
statue onto his washing bench.  As he pours water over its “tiny head,” the 
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entire sculpture “dissolves into tiny fragments,”56 as though cancelling a 
Kristevan severance with a complete disintegration.  At the very end, Jawad’s 
heart is like a “shriveled pomegranate beating with death and falling every 
second into a bottomless pit,"57 in other words, into a void that, in striking 
contrast, the novel confronts, or we might say stands up to, with full force.   
Jawad fails to traverse Kristeva’s “arc of Nothingness,” as he engages 
death without mediation (unlike Perseus with his shield).  In acquiescing to 
corpse washing, Jawad embraces death literally in a way that disallows a 
distancing interiorization of mortality indispensable to a creative act.  He joins 
death instead of recognizing that life and death are, as the pomegranate tree 
knows, “conjoined, sculpting each other."58  Despite his admiration of 
Giacometti, in the end Jawad fails to sculpt or to appreciate such sculpting.  
Finally, it is true, he identifies himself with the pomegranate tree that receives 
a great deal of attention in the novel mainly for drawing its sustenance from 
the water that spills off corpses, the water of death.  This “wondrous tree” 
imbibes the water of death and yet, for decades, has flourished:  “budding, 
blossoming, and bearing fruit every spring."59  But Jawad depicts himself as a 
pomegranate tree all of whose “branches have been cut, broken, and buried 
with the dead."60  In contrast to the pomegranate tree, Jawad has not been able 
to sublimate death, to transfer its force into something beautiful, as the 
pomegranate tree, we might say, dissolves the beyond in the visible, effecting 
that crucial passage.   
Echoing Kristeva, The Corpse Washer cautions against failing to write, to 
draw, to sculpt, or to produce images that assuage the violence.  It bombards 
us with images of the dead, culminating in a severed head to do so, and is 
consequently able to conclude with a luminous tree that exfoliates Kristeva’s 
main idea, that the void is the condition for thought and creativity.  It is that 
“remedy” for Jawad’s “malady” that the “pomegranate tree alone knows."61  
Sitting next to the tree, Jawad hums, “Pity me, pity me/ O Pomegranate tree/ 
I’ve become skin and bones/ And nobody knows/ My malady/ And nobody 
knows/ My remedy/ Pity me, pity me/ O Pomegranate tree."62  While the 
tree grounds its roots “in the depths of hell,” Jawad, as a victim of a “random 
and violent” history, “storming and uprooting everything and everyone 
without ever turning back,”63 has lost his bearings.   
The novel, however, exerts itself to displace that history by settling in 
those same “depths of hell” in order to bear fruit.  Grounding itself firmly in 
those hellish depths, The Corpse Washer enacts a Kristevan psychoanalytic 
sublation as it confronts, distances itself from, and thereby psychically cancels 
Iraqi losses only to preserve them now in elegant writing.  One might say that 
Antoon does an even better job than Kristeva—who writes that in her 
“endless mourning, in which language and the body revive in the heartbeat 
of a grafted French,” she examines “the still warm corpse of [her] maternal 
memory"64—of keeping corpses warm.  Antoon’sThe Corpse Washer is in line 
with all art that, in Kristeva’s description, projects “cuts, castrations, and 
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wounds of every kind, to acquire . . . a bit of meaning, a little distance, some 
air, a certain freedom,” carving out an abyss so that the suffering and carnage 
can be “resorbed into the black of the line that draws the violence with 
economy."65  In the last chapter of the book, the pomegranate tree’s “red 
blossoms [open] like wounds on the branches, breathing and calling out."66  
Antoon’s novel serves as a passageway through an arc of Nothingness to 
conjure the invisible and deliver it to visibility.   
Although this Kristevan reading of The Corpse Washer focuses specifically 
on an Arab/Muslim culture, which cannot be translated into a racial category, 
like my analyses elsewhere of Pamuk’s The Museum of Innocence (set in 
Turkey) and Cha’s Dictée (focused on Korea),67 it is meant to show the 
pertinence of Kristevan psychoanalytic theory in a non-Western context.  One 
might go about linking such psychoanalytic work on non-Western writing to 
“race” in two ways.  Insofar as The Corpse Washer demonstrates the validity of 
Kristevan psychoanalytic theory for non-Western art/artists, it implies the 
universality of that theory, despite ethnicity, race, religion, etc.  Or if we 
presuppose the universality of Kristevan psychoanalytic theory, we may 
think of such work as testing the assumption that psychoanalysis can traverse 
all such culturally constructed boundaries.  Kristeva’s recent involvement 
with Islamic youth in the suburbs of Paris would also shore up the notion that 
her theory is by no means limited.  And to those critics who challenge Kristeva 
on the grounds that she focuses on Arab violence, it needs to be said that she 
opposes all fundamentalisms and in particular nationalist radicalism, such as 
(for example) that promoted by Marine Le Pen.           
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